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Summary 
According to the statistics of occupational accidents, it is observed that the number of 
accidents occurred in shipbuilding industry is high and the rate of deaths and serious injuries 
among these accidents is higher than in other industries. However, the number of the studies 
to prevent these accidents in both industrial and scientific practices is considerably low. 
Therefore, the objective of this study is to develop an efficient risk preventive model in 
accordance with occupational health and safety regulations for industrial organizations. The 
approach proposed in this study differs from those described in the literature, because it is 
based on fuzzy set theory in order to cope with uncertainties on probability and severity 
definitions in terms of occupational health and safety. Furthermore, in this paper, risk severity 
is considered in terms of harm to worker, harm to environment, and harm to hardware, 
whereas in the literature, risk severity is generally considered solely in terms of only harm to 
worker.  Then, risk magnitude is obtained by utilizing fuzzy inference system. The proposed 
approach is applied to a shipyard located in the Marmara Region in order to illustrate the 
applicability of the model.  
Keywords:         occupational safety and health; shipyard’s work process; risk assessment 
and analysis; accident prevention 
1. Introduction 
 Efforts to reduce work accidents and occupational diseases at industries are getting 
widespread in Turkey. Especially, reestablishment actions of organizations concerning safety 
are being tried to get under control with the Occupational Health and Safety Law. In the 
world, the number of accidents occurred at shipbuilding industry is higher than in other 
industries [16]. According to studies on accidents in Turkey, the number of accidents occurred 
in shipyards is high and compensations for deaths and injuries are more expensive [1]. 
Although shipyards have constantly work accident problems, the number of studies to prevent 
these accidents in both industrial and scientific practices is considerably low. Therefore, in 
this paper, a risk-preventive model has been proposed in order to prevent accidents and 
occupational diseases at shipyards. 
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 A proactive approach analyzing possible risks of organizations is required to prevent 
occupational accidents and diseases [8]. Thus, it is aimed at avoiding accidents before they 
happen through risk assessment. In terms of the theoretical perspective, there are various 
techniques for risk analysis and assessment in the literature [6] such as qualitative, 
quantitative, and hybrid techniques. The success of the qualitative techniques is based on both 
analytical estimation processes and expertise of safety managers or engineers. However, 
quantitative techniques present risk magnitude by a mathematical relation based on the real 
accidents data recorded at a work site [14]. The mathematical relations used in the 
quantitative techniques are generally based on the probability of occurrence of accidents and 
prediction of severity of accidents when they occur. However, it is hard to define precisely 
probability and severity of incidents taking place at work place because accident statistics are 
not completely recorded by organizations. Furthermore, magnitude of the severity cannot be 
measured precisely. Therefore, most of these techniques use linguistic terms and categorical 
data to obtain risk magnitude by multiplying probability with severity. Hence, based on the 
traditional risk assessment techniques, there are two obstacles; the first one is that the 
distribution of risk magnitude obtained by the result of multiplication presents an inconsistent 
variability [20] and the second is that the definitions for probability and severity include 
uncertainty because of the categorical structure of the collected data. In the literature, fuzzy 
sets are widely used to cope with uncertainties in real case problems [27]. Therefore, in this 
study, a risk assessment method that is based on fuzzy set theory and fuzzy AHP has been 
developed in order to consider uncertainties on probability and severity definitions. In the 
proposed model, risk severity is considered in terms of harm to worker, harm to environment, 
and harm to hardware. Then, risk degree is obtained based on risk severity and risk likelihood 
of the determined risks under fuzzy environment. The proposed approach is applied to work 
stations in ship production process.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: literature review related to the topic is 
given is Section 2. Section 3 presents the mathematical foundation of the proposed algorithm. 
Section 4 deals with the application of the proposed algorithm on ship production process in 
order to illustrate the proposed algorithm. Finally, concluding remarks are given in Section 5. 
2. Literature review 
The studies in the literature for the shipyard industry regarding occupational accidents 
and risk assessment processes are limited although the results of these accidents are serious. 
These studies can be summarized as follows: Ozkok [17] presented a risk assessment 
application on pin jig work unit by using fuzzy analytical hierarchical process (AHP). In 
another study, Ozkok [18] obtained the failure statistical data of the shipyards and then 
comprehensive process analysis was done on shipyard workstations by using the Failure 
Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). Barlas [1] presented a study which analyzed the fatality 
rate and the causes of fatality accidents in Turkish shipbuilding industry. In another study, 
Barlas [2] used AHP to analyze fatal occupational accidents at shipyards. Yun and Park [26] 
developed an industry safety management system for the risk-free backward operation of 
forklift trucks at shipbuilding industry in Korea. Mora et al. [16] investigated accident records 
between the years 2000 and 2010 to demonstrate the severity of the accidents which occurred 
at the shipbuilding industry. Jeong et al. [13] analyzed risks of the cancer incidence in 
shipyard workers in Korea. Celebi et al. [7] presented a detailed study about all processes in 
shipbuilding in order to investigate risks of the occupational safety and health. Jacinto and 
Silva [12] proposed a semi-quantitative risk assessment methodology by using bow-tie 
method for shipbuilding industry. Cherniack et al. [10] presented a study on sensory nerve 
conduction velocity in shipyard workers who were occupationally exposed to hand-arm 
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vibration. Mattorano et al. [15] investigated human health hazard of metal exposure during 
ship repair and production operations. 
Finally, there are a few studies in the literature about occupational health and safety and 
they refer to various accidents. In some papers in the literature, risk scores were generated by 
depending on severity and possibility of accidents [17; 18; 2], risky workstations were 
specified, a situation analysis was executed based on statistical evaluation of accidents [16; 
13; 1] or detailed research was done about the causes of only one of the types of these 
accidents [26; 24; 5; 8]. However, these papers consider types or causes of these accidents. It 
is clear that all of these studies are reactive and a proactive approach towards preventing 
accidents has not been proposed yet. Therefore, in this paper, a proactive and systematic 
approach has been proposed in order to prevent occupational accidents and illnesses. 
Furthermore, none of these studies utilizes fuzzy set theory although risk assessment 
procedure includes qualitative evaluation. Fuzzy sets are widely used as an effective tool for 
the evaluation of qualitative data including uncertainties [27]. In the literature, there are some 
applications which used the fuzzy logic successfully for accident analysis. Celik and Cebi [8] 
wrote an article which analyses an accident based on fuzzy set theory. Beriha et al. [3] 
presented a model using fuzzy approach in order to evaluate the safety performance in 
industry. Tadic et al. [23] demonstrated that fuzzy modeling for evaluating occupational risks 
can be applied successfully. Also, Pinto et al. [19] pointed out advantages of using fuzzy sets 
approach in order to cope with ill-defined situations in the article on occupational risk 
assessment methods used in the construction industry. Zeng et al [28] proposed a risk 
assessment model on completing construction project in order to evaluate risks for 
construction sector. Cebi [6] proposed a fuzzy based risk assessment model to evaluate the 
risks of timely incompletion of construction projects which are received by the contractor 
firms. Bragatto et al. [4] also presented a study which assessed the impact of occupational 
safety control programs in the industry by using a fuzzy model. 
Most of the risk assessment techniques in the literature are based on two parameters 
which are the probability of risks and the potential hazards of related risks. Furthermore, these 
techniques obtain risk magnitude by using multiplication of risk severity with risk likelihood. 
However, Plues et al. [20] have stressed that the distribution of risk magnitude obtained by 
multiplication showed an inconsistent variability as well as in the FMEA technique while 
determining the risk magnitude depending on the expert opinion. In the risk assessment 
studies, risk magnitude, risk severity and risk likelihood are usually evaluated linguistically. 
In this study, which differs from those presented in the literature, we aimed at determining the 
risk magnitude based on probability of risk, severity of risk, and frequencies of events by 
using fuzzy set theory in order to consider uncertainty on probability and risk severity 
definitions. 
3. Proposed methodology 
A risk assessment structure is generally based on identification (I), analysis (A), 
response (R), and review and monitor (RM). Identification phase includes determining risks 
caused by potential hazards. The analysis phase is to calculate risk magnitude based on two 
parameters, (i) risk likelihood and (ii) risk severity. The response phase includes determining 
risk control options. Finally, the review phase is to monitor whether the selected risk control 
options eliminate or decrease risk magnitude or not. In this paper, we propose a methodology 
for the systematic and quantitative measurement of risk magnitude. The structure of the 
proposed methodology is given in Figure 1. The steps of the proposed approach are as 
follows; 
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Figure 1 The structure of the proposed method 
3.1 Identification phase 
First, a risk assessment team consisting of experts with different maritime-related 
background is established.  Then, operation is defined and potential hazards are identified.   
Step 1.1 Describe operations: In this step, production process is divided into small work 
stations based on the similarities of operations. This classification procedure makes it easier 
for risk evaluation.  
Step 1.2 Identify potential hazards: In this step, potential hazards resulting from 
operations are identified and risks are determined. The sources of any hazard can be classified 
into five categories; (i) physical factors, (ii) chemical factors, (iii) biological factors, (iv) 
mechanical factors, and (v) human factors.  Each expert in the risk assessment team has to 
review all information related to the operation under consideration in order to determine the 
risks. 
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3.2 Analysis phase 
In this phase, determined risks are analyzed to obtain risk magnitude. In the literature, 
most of the techniques, such as L-Type Matrix, X-Type Matrix, Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
(PHA), utilize two parameters to obtain risk magnitude (RM). These parameters are risk 
likelihood (RL) and risk severity (RS). RM for a risk is generally obtained by scalar 
multiplication of RL and RS. However, there is an inconsistent variance of the risk score 
distribution when a multiplication-based formula is used to obtain RM [20]. Furthermore, the 
risk assessment process includes uncertainties and subjectivities. Therefore, it is essential to 
use fuzzy techniques in order to cope with these uncertainties and subjectivities [28]. 
Step 2.1 Determine likelihood: In this step, likelihoods of the determined risks, which 
represent the probabilities of accident occurring, are determined by the risk assessment team. 
For this, the risk assessment team utilizes FAHP to determine likelihoods. Experts in the risk 
assessment team are asked to evaluate each risk by using a set of pairwise comparisons. The 
main aim of this step is to obtain an importance degree that presents likelihood for the 
determined risks. In this study, FAHP developed by Buckley (1985) is used [9; 11].  
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The linguistic scale for triangular fuzzy numbers in Equation (2) is explained linguistically in 
Table 1. 
Table 1  Linguistic scale for the weight matrix [11] 
Linguistic scales Abbreviation Fuzzy numbers 
Equally important (Eq) (1,1,3) 
Weakly important (Wk) (1,3,5) 
Essentially important (Es) (3,5,7) 
Very strongly important (Vs) (5,7,9) 
Absolutely important (Ab) (7,9,9) 
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where inc
~ is the fuzzy comparison value between the related risks and ir
~ is the geometric mean 
of fuzzy comparison values. RLw
~  represents likelihood for the related risk. When there are 
more than one expert in the evaluation process and if each expert presents own judgements, 
geometric mean method is used to aggregate the experts’ preferences. 
Step 2.2 Determine severity: In this study, different from the literature, severity (RS) is 
taken into consideration in terms of three parameters. These parameters are Harm to 
Employee (RSH), Harm to System (RSS), and Harm to Environment (RSE). Each expert 
presents own preferences on these parameters and then co-decision matrix is obtained by 
arithmetic mean method. For the evaluations, linguistic scale given in Table 2 is used. 
Table 2 Linguistic scale for risk severity 
Type Risk Severity Linguistic Term 
RSH 
No loss of working time Very Low (VL) 
No loss of working days (There is loss of working time) Low (L) 
Loss of working days Medium (M) 
Loss of working weeks High (H) 
Permanent Unfitness/Occupational Disease/Death/ Very High (VH) 
RSS 
No damage on the system None (N) 
There is a little damage but system still works Very Low (VL) 
Damage on the system causes loss of working time Low (L) 
Damage on the system causes loss of working days Medium (M) 
Damage on the system causes loss of working weeks High (H) 
Damage on the system causes out of service Very High (VH) 
RSE 
No damage on environment None (N) 
Damage on environment can be removed in a short time Very Low (VL) 
Damage on environment can be removed in a short term Low (L) 
Damage on environment can be removed in a medium term Medium (M) 
Damage on environment can be removed in a long term High (H) 
Damage on environment cannot be removed Very High (VH) 
Step 2.3 Obtain the risk magnitude: In this step, fuzzy inference system proposed by 
Mamdani (1977) is used to obtain risk magnitude (RM) since it is an effective tool to cope 
with imprecise and vague information [28]. The steps of Mamdani Fuzzy Inference technique 
are given in the following.  
The aggregated fuzzy numbers of RL, RSH, RSS, and RSE are converted into matching 
fuzzy sets in order to obtain membership value of input data since fuzzy numbers cannot be 
directly used in a fuzzy inference system. In the basis of the fuzzy inference, there is a 
knowledge base including several rules defined by experts. A rule (Rk) is presented in a form 
of if-then rule and it present relations among input parameters (RL, RSH,  RSS, and RSE) and 





























RL  and,,,  represents membership value of 
RMRSRSRSRL SEH and,,,, , respectively. By using max-min operation (Equation 6), the 
value of RM is obtained. 
        43211:)( xxxxy kRSSkRSEkRSHkRLKkkRM     (6) 
An Effective Risk-Preventive Model O. Acuner, S. Cebi. 
Proposal for Occupational Accidents at Shipyards  
73 
where 44332211 ,,,, XxandXxXxXxYy   represents universe of 
SEH RSRSRSRLRM and,,,, since the obtained output from fuzzy inference system is a 
fuzzy set, it is required to defuzzify output into a crisp value. For the defuzzification process, 



















where Zi represents the center of the i
th fuzzy term set of RM. 
3.3 Response phase 
In this phase, risks are ranked from highest to lowest based on their risk magnitude and 
the best control option is selected. The following steps are used during selection of control 
options. 
1. Eliminate hazards at their source 
2. Replace a source of hazard with a less dangerous source of hazard  
3. Take engineering controls on the source 
4. Take organizational administrative controls on the source 
5. Use personal proactive equipment (PPE) 
3.4 Monitor and review phase 
   In this phase, the selected control options are monitored and reviewed. 
4. Application 
Apart from requiring great skills in metal-working techniques, the shipbuilding process 
requires a professionalism and knowledge of numerous technical sectors, such as erection of 
scaffolding for constructing the hull and plating, electrical wiring, raising and moving 
operations, sandblasting, cleaning and painting and all the details of fitting-out [25]. Each of 
these activities is hard and complex. Therefore, various accidents occur during the 
implementation of these activities. In this paper, the risk assessment of a shipyard which 
performs the construction of new vessels in the Marmara Region has been considered in order 
to illustrate the proposed approach. 
4.1 Identification phase 
First, it is necessary to create a risk assessment team. The risk assessment team in this 
study consists of two different groups. The first one is a risk assessment team in the shipyard. 
Since the risk assessment team should include experts who are employees in the related firm, 
for the needs of this study, it has been the risk assessment team of the shipyard under 
consideration. The second group consists of three people who have expertise both in shipyard 
applications and in academic studies. 
Step 1.1 Describe operations: Since ship production process includes thousands of work 
activities and requires various types of work stations, it is an extremely complex process. The 
production process starts with cutting of steel and it ends with joining hull blocks. Figure 2 
roughly presents the work flow chart of ship production process [18]. 
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Figure 2 Workflow chart of the work stations in the ship production process [18] 
Step 1.2 Identify potential hazards: All risks should be grouped depending on the 
equipment used during production process. In this step, fourteen potential hazards were 
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Table 3 The risks identified for the processes carried out in the shipyard 
 













F1 Unsuitable placing of load 
F2 Passenger transport by forklift 
F3 Unbalanced loading of forklift 
F4 Discharge of forklift hydraulic  
F5 Forklift capsizing 
F6 Crashing into surrounding workers with fork 

















 V1 Removal of load the more than lifting tonnage/Overloading the crane 
V2 Lifting load up to the rafters with the cob  
V3 To go off the rails of cranes/Derailing of the crane 
V4 Unhooking of sling during lifting 
V5 Power loss during load in crane hook/Power failure during operation 
V6 Falling crane, slipping load, bleeding of brake 
V7 Falling from height 
V8 Hit one another cranes moving on the same rail 











TO1 Maintenance or tip replacement without switching of the power supply 
TO2 Splashing burr to the eye during operation 
TO3 Cleaning turnings by hand 
TO4 Splashing material on the turning machine during operation 
TO5 Electrical leakage at the turning lathe 
TO6 Entrapment of worker’s limb in the rotating part of the lathe 





M1 Worker’s body is pulled over the drill  
M2 Splashing burr to the eye during operation 
M3 Doing maintenance while the drill is running 
M4 Cleaning turnings by hand 
M5 Unfavorable securing of the work piece 
M6 Tip replacement while the drill is running  





 S1 Using a wrong sling 
S2 Using a damaged sling 











 EK1 Emission of toxic gases and fumes during welding 
EK2 Exposure to UV radiation 
EK3 Electric shock 













GK1 Splashing burr onto the eye during welding 
GK2 Emission of fumes during welding 
GK3 Exposure to released UV radiation during welding 
GK4 Electric shock 
GK5 Working in non-ergonomic body posture 
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TK1 Emission of fumes during welding 
TK2 Exposure to released UV radiation during welding 
TK3 Electric shock 
TK4 Splashing burr onto the eye during welding 











 O1 Idle operation of torch 
O2 Leaving off the locality of the welding torch during breaks and rest 
O3 Non-closure of the tube valves during breaks and rest 
O4 Exposure to released UV radiation 
O5 Disregarding the use of oxy-acetylene 







K1 Oscillating of the lifted load 
K2 Exceeding the lifting capacity 
K3 Lifting long plate or profile with one apparatus 
K4 Unfavorable connecting of load to dovetail 
K5 Routing manually of load 










 D1 Storage of hazardous materials in the main storage 
D2 Storage done so as to prevent the use and operation of the fire extinguishing installation 
D3 Danger of tipping over rolling of materials such as rod and pipe 
D4 Materials falling from the shelves in the store 











 MK1 Perform cutting without fastening materials  
MK2 Tipping over and falling on operating  machines  
MK3 Hand contact with the cutting area while the  machine is operating 
MK4 Splashing burr onto the eye during cutting 
MK5 Removing the machine protective cover/covers 








T1 Lathes grinders cut 
T2 Stone bursting 
T3 Stone bursting 
T4 Power blackout and leaving the device open during grinding 
T5 The presence of flammable and / or burning objects close to the place of work 
T6 Disk compression and rebound in confined work areas 
T7 Not well-screwing the stone 
T8 Turning on the engine while machine is plugging 









G1_1 The presence of unauthorized persons in the work area 
G1_2 The lack of qualified employees 
G1_3 Improper maintenance  
G1_4 Not providing the required personal protective equipment 
G1_5 Not using the necessary personal protective equipment 
G1_6 Lack of  necessary training 
G1_7 Working in non-ergonomic body posture 
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4.2 Analysis phase 
Step 2.1 Determine likelihood: In this step, decision matrices on likelihoods of the 
identified risks in the previous step were constructed by providing consensus among the 
experts. Pairwise comparisons related with the risks of grinding are shown in Table 4 in order 
to illustrate this step. Linguistic expressions in Table 4 were converted into fuzzy numbers 
using the scale given in Table 1. Then the probabilities of risks were obtained by using 
Equations 3 and 4. Fuzzy values of the risks’ probability for grinding operation are as follows:  
wT1 [0.44, 0.8, 2.27], [wT2 (0.11, 0.2, 0.5)], [wT3 (1.4, 2.84, 6.28)], [wT4 (0.39, 0.8, 2.01)], 
[wT5 (0.1, 0.2, 0.44)], [wT6(1.24, 2.84, 5.55)], [wT7 (0.34, 0.8, 1.78)], [wT8 (0.3, 0.8, 1.58)] 
and [wT9 (0.27, 0.71, 1.4)]. 
Table 4 Pairwise comparison matrix for the risks of grinding 
 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 
T1  Es 1/Es Eq Es 1/Es Eq Eq Eq 
T2  1/Vs 1/Es Eq 1/Vs 1/Es 1/Es 1/Es 
T3   Es Vs Eq Es Es Es 
T4    Es 1/Es Eq Eq Eq 
T5     1/Vs 1/Es 1/Es 1/Es 
T6      Es Es Es 
T7       Eq Eq 
T8        Eq 
T9          
 
Step 2.2 Determine severity: The severity of the risks are evaluated in terms of harm to 
the workers, harm to the environment and harm to the machine by using linguistic expressions 
given in Table 2 by the expert team. Table 5 is given to illustrate the evaluation of the 
severity. The linguistic expressions given in Table 5 are converted into fuzzy numbers by 
using the scale given in Figure 3.   
 
Table 5 Risk severities for grinding operation 
  Linguistic Expressions for Severity Fuzzy Numbers for Severity 
  RSH RSM RSE RSH RSM RSE 
    E1 E2 E3 E1 E2 E3       
RS_T1 H L VL VL L VL M (5, 7.5, 10) (0, 0.8, 3.3) (0.8, 2.5, 5) 
RS_T2 H L M M H M H (5, 7.5, 10) (1.7, 4.2, 6.7) (4.2, 6.7, 9.2) 
RS_T3 H VL VL VL VL VL L (5, 7.5, 10) (0, 0, 2.5) (0, 0.8, 3.3) 
RS_T4 L H M L VL L L (0, 2.5, 5) (2.5, 5, 7.5) (0, 1.7, 4.2) 
RS_T5 VH H VH L H VH VH (7.5, 10, 10) (4.2, 6.7, 8.3) (6.7, 9.2, 10) 
RS_T6 VL M H M M L M (0, 0, 2.5) (3.3, 5.8, 8.3) (1.7, 4.2, 6.7) 
RS_T7 L M M H M M M (0, 2.5, 5) (3.3, 5.8, 8.3) (2.5, 5, 7.5) 
RS_T8 L M H M VL H M (0, 2.5, 5) (3.3, 5.8, 8.3) (2.5, 4.2, 6.7) 
RS_T9 L VL L M VL L H (0, 2.5, 5) (0.8, 2.5,5) (1.7, 3.3, 5.8) 
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Figure 3 The scale of the triangular fuzzy numbers 
Step 2.3 Obtain the risk magnitude: The membership values for the fuzzy numbers 
obtained in Step 2.1 and Step 2.2 are calculated by using the scale given in Figure 3. Table 6 
and Table 7 show the obtained membership values for risk likelihood and risk severity of 
grinding operation, respectively. 
Table 6 Membership values of the risk likelihood for grinding operation 
 
Membership degrees for RL 
 
VL L M H VH 
µRLT1 0.73 0.63 0.07 
  µRLT2 0.93 0.19 
   µRLT3 0.28 0.93 0.64 0.22 
 µRLT4 0.73 0.54 
   µRLT5 0.93 0.16 
   µRLT6 0.32 0.93 0.59 0.12 
 µRLT7 0.73 0.51 
   µRLT8 0.74 0.49 
   µRLT9 0.76 0.44 
   
Table 7 Membership values of the risk severity for grinding operation 
 
RSH RSM RSE 
 
VL L M H VH VL L M H VH VL L M H VH 
µRST1   
0.50 1.00 0.50 0.76 0.66 0.16 
  




0.50 1.00 0.50 0.16 0.67 0.84 0.34 
 
 
0.16 0.67 0.84 0.35 
µRST3 
  
0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.50 
  
 
0.76 0.66 0.16 
 
 
µRST4 0.5 1.00 0.50 
  
 
0.50 1.00 0.50 
 




   
0.50 1.00 
 
0.16 0.66 0.85 0,20 
  
0.17 0.66 0.75 
µRST6 1.0 0.50 
   
 
0.34 0.84 0.66 0,17 0.16 0.67 0.84 0.34 
 
µRST7 0.5 1.00 0.50 
  
 
0.34 0.84 0.66 0,17 
 
0.50 1.00 0.50 
 
µRST8 0.5 1.00 0.50 
  
 
0.34 0.84 0.66 0,17 
 
0.60 0.84 0.34 
 
µRST9 0.5 1.00 0.50     0.40 1.00 0.50     0.20 0.80 0.66 0.16   
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Table 8 The risk magnitudes related to the identified risk 
 Membership degree for RM The risk values for RM 
  N Mi Ma C RM N Mi Ma C 
RM_F1 0.5 0.5 0.87 0 4.59 
 
70.50% 29.50% 
 RM_F2 0.78 0.46 0.46 0 3.44 
 
100% 
  RM_F3 0.77 0.5 0.41 0 3.36 
 
100% 
  RM_F4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0 4 
 
100% 
  RM_F5 0.34 0.84 0.6 0 4.44 
 
78% 22% 
 RM_F6 0.66 0.84 0.5 0 3.76  100%    
RM_V1 0 0.32 0.84 0.16 6.64 
  
100% 
 RM_V2 0 0.84 0.33 0 4.85 
 
57.50% 42.50% 
 RM_V3 0 0.5 0.76 0 5.81 
 
9.50% 90.50% 
 RM_V4 0 0.58 0.66 0 5.6 
 
20% 80% 
 RM_V5 0 0.85 0.5 0 5.11 
 
44.50% 55.50% 
 RM_V6 0 0.66 0.75 0 5.6 
 
20% 80% 
 RM_V7 0 0.5 0.84 0 5.88 
 
6% 94% 
 RM_V8 0.34 0.5 0.84 0 4.89  55.50% 44.50%  
RM_TO1 0 0.75 0.44 0 5.11 
 
44.50% 55.50% 
 RM_TO2 0 0 0.75 0.82 8.57 
  
21.50% 78.50% 
RM_TO3 0.5 0.5 0.41 0 3.81 
 
100% 
  RM_TO4 0.76 0.5 0.38 0 3.3  100%   
RM_M1 0.5 0.76 0.36 0 3.74 
 
100% 
  RM_M2 0 0 0.76 0.69 8.43 
  
28.50% 71.50% 
RM_M3 0 0.76 0.32 0 4.89 
 
55.50% 44.50% 
 RM_M4 0.76 0.5 0.34 0 3.21 
 
100% 
  RM_M5 0.5 0.5 0.82 0 4.53  73.50% 26.50%  
RM_EK1 0.34 0.5 0.76 0.41 5.85 
 
7.50% 92.50% 
 RM_EK2 0.34 0.5 0.84 0 4.89  55.50% 44.50%  
RM_GK1 0.5 0.6 0.63 0 4.23 
 
88.50% 11.50% 
 RM_GK2 0.16 0.5 0.76 0.11 5.61 
 
19.50% 80.50% 
 RM_GK3 0.35 0.5 0.82 0 4.84 
 
58% 42% 
 RM_GK4 0.5 0.84 0.22 0 3.46  100%    
RM_TK1 0.5 0.5 0.88 0.2 5.13 
 
43.50% 56.50% 
 RM_TK2 0.5 0.65 0.84 0 4.51 
 
74.50% 25.50% 
 RM_TK3 0 0.84 0.28 0 4.75 
 
62.50% 37.50% 
 RM_TK4 0 0.61 0.64 0 5.54  23% 77%  
RM_O1 0.5 0.81 0.36 0 3.75 
 
100% 
  RM_O2 0.5 0.76 0.31 0 3.64 
 
100% 
  RM_O3 0 0.46 0.76 0.32 6.73 
  
100% 
 RM_O4 0 0 0.93 0.69 8.28 
  
36% 64% 
RM_O5 0.8 0.5 0.18 0 2.74 13% 87%     
RM_K1 0 0 0.84 0.75 8.42 
  
29% 71% 
RM_K2 0 0.62 0.72 0.21 6.21 
  
100% 
 RM_K3 0 0.63 0.67 0 5.55 
 
22.50% 77.50% 
 RM_K4 0 0.64 0.64 0 5.5 
 
25% 75% 
 RM_K5 0 0.65 0.57 0 5.4  30% 70%  
RM_S1 0 0.08 0.8 0.6 8.05 
  
47.50% 52.50% 
RM_S2 0 0.23 0.76 0.7 7.83 
  
58.50% 41.50% 
RM_S3 0 0.3 0.83 0.55 7.45   77.50% 22.50% 
RM_D1 0.28 0.66 0.76 0 4.85 
 
57.50% 42.50% 
 RM_D2 0.36 0.76 0.5 0 4.26 
 
87% 13% 
 RM_D3 0.34 0.7 0.76 0 4.7 
 
65% 35% 
 RM_D4 0.17 0.61 0.63 0 4.98  51% 49%  
RM_MK1 0.84 0.25 0.25 0 2.68 16% 84% 
  RM_MK2 0.5 0.53 0.77 0 4.45 
 
77.50% 22.50% 
 RM_MK3 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.34 5.37 
 
31.50% 68.50% 
 RM_MK4 0.5 0.84 0.5 0 4 
 
100% 
  RM_MK5 0.67 0.56 0.5 0 3.71  100%   
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The risk magnitudes of the identified risks are given in Table 8.  The risk magnitudes 
given are calculated as an absolute numerical value using Equation 7 by utilizing the scale 
given in Figure 4. The risk magnitude in Figure 4 is divided into four levels: negligible (N), 
minor (Mi), major (MA) and critical risk (C). For example, the risk magnitude of T2 is 
calculated as 3.73 by using Equation 7. When this value is plotted in the graph given in Figure 





Figure 4 Rectangular fuzzy numbers for risk magnitudes 
4.3 Response phase 
The risk groups initially formed in Step 1.2 are ranked according to their risk 
magnitudes. The rank from the biggest to lowest is as follows: use of slings (7.78), dovetail 
transport (6.21), crane transport (5.55), electric arc welding operation (5.37), turning 
operation (5.20), oxygen cutting operation (5.03), submerged welding operation (4.98), use of 
drill (4.96), storage (4.70), inert-gas welding operation (4.53), grinding operation (4.08), 
material cutting operation (4.04), forklift transport (3.93).  
It is observed that the most of these risks are of tolerable degrees. For this risk group, 
periodic maintenance applications for machines and equipment are usually sufficient. For this 
group, it is possible to prevent problems that may occur in the future and are associated with 
the conditions such as occurrence of changes in the materials and equipment, in the 
technology, and in the production methods by ensuring continuous control and by informing 
workers in advance.  
The current critical risks obtained from this study are defined as (1) Splashing burr on to 
eye during operation, (2) Exposure to released UV radiation, (3)  Oscillating of the lifted load 
during dovetail transport use, and (4) risks related to the use of slings. For the first and second 
groups of risks, it is required to improve the awareness of employees and to promote the use 
of protective equipment. In order to obtain the appropriate risk magnitude for the third and 
fourth groups of risks, it is necessary to provide personnel training, continuous control, and 
supervision service. 
4.4 Monitor and review phase 
Within the scope of this study, the magnitudes of the identified risks are analyzed. The 
establishment of the monitor and review process is one of the most critical steps of the 
organization’s risk management process. For this purpose, daily, weekly and monthly check 
lists have been prepared for the each work station in order to make sure that the specified 
management action plans remain relevant and updated. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper a new risk assessment approach has been proposed. The differences of the 
proposed methodology can be summarized as follows. (i) Risk severity is considered taking 
into account three parameters: harm to worker, harm to environment, and harm to hardware. 
In other words, the proposed method uses three inputs for risk severity. Traditional 
techniques, however, utilize only one parameter for risk severity combining all types of 
severities. The advantage of this feature is that the severity of any accident can be considered 
in detail and so precautions can be better designed. (ii) In the literature, risk severity and risk 
probability parameters are widely used to obtain risk magnitude. However, the collected data 
for these parameters are in linguistic or categorical form. This presents an uncertainty. To 
overcome this difficulty, fuzzy set theory is utilized in the proposed method. (iii) In the 
literature, while obtaining risk magnitude, scalar multiplication is generally used. However, 
the result of multiplication presents an inconsistent variability [20]. Therefore, in the proposed 
method Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) has been used to calculate risk magnitudes. 
The proposed approach has been applied to shipyards. For this purpose, fourteen work 
stations have been constructed based on the work process and utilized technology in the 
process. Possible sources of hazard are defined and the risks associated with these hazards are 
identified for these work stations. Then, experts evaluate these risks by using linguistic scale. 
In the evaluation, risk severity is considered in terms of harm to environment, harm to 
employee, and harm to hardware. The probabilities of the defined risks for each work station 
are determined based on the pairwise comparisons. Furthermore, a rule based system 
associated with relations among risk magnitude, risk probability, and risk severities (harm to 
employee, harm to environment, and harm to hardware) has been developed. Then, the risk 
magnitude for each risk is calculated based on these data by using fuzzy inference system. 
Hence, the most risky operations have been determined in the shipbuilding process for the 
considered shipyard.  
The strengths of the proposed risk model are as follows: (i) the model considers risk 
severity, probability, and risk magnitude terms by using fuzzy set theory in terms of 
occupational health and safety. (ii) Risk severity term is considered by using three different 
terms: harm to hardware, harm to environment and harm to employee. Furthermore, it is the 
first time that the proposed method has been used for risk evaluation for ship production 
process. In the literature, there is not any study to evaluate risks in terms of occupational 
health and safety in the whole ship production process. However, the weakness of the 
proposed model is that the model includes a set of complex computations. This makes the 
calculation process hard and unpractical. Therefore, in the further work, a decision support 
system may be developed based on proposed model in order to make computation process 
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APPENDIX  
App. Table 1 Fuzzy rule based for risks 
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